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DOUBLING DOWN ON SPORTS GAMBLING: 
WHY PASPA WOULD FAIL A 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE 
JEFFREY ROESKE 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Move over baseball, America has a new favorite pastime: sports gambling.  
Upon examining the facts, it is hard to debate the overwhelming and rampant 
obsession Americans have with sports gambling.  Recent estimates show that 
Americans wager over $500 billion per year on sports.1  Of this staggering total, 
only $2–3 billion per year are gambled legally within the state of Nevada, the 
only state in the country that currently allows individual sports betting.2  The 
rest of the bets are placed with illegal bookmakers (bookies) or on Internet 
gambling sites.3 
Sports gambling is not necessarily a new sensation.  Ask a sports fan about 
betting within sports and the stories are widespread.  Baseball experienced the 
Black Sox scandal of 1919, where some of the Chicago White Sox players were 
accused of, and in some cases admitted to, fixing the World Series.4  Baseball 
also saw the legendary Pete Rose go down in history as someone who bet on the 
game of baseball.5  Football saw both the Detroit Lions’ Alex Karras and the 
Green Bay Packers’ Paul Hornung suspended by NFL Commissioner Pete 
Rozelle for their involvements with sports gambling.6  Other sports have 
experienced similar problems with sports gambling and match fixing within the 
United States.7  Yet, these stories fail to tell the whole tale in regards to the 
 
1. Chad Millman, Authorities Expose $50M Betting Ring, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/espn/story 
/_/id/8550476/new-york-issues-25-indictments-50-million-betting-ring (last updated Oct. 25, 2012). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Amanda Rykoff, Sports Scandals from Bountygate to Black Sox:‘Black Sox’ Remain Black Mark 
on Baseball, ESPNW (Mar. 5, 2012), http://espn.go.com/espnw/commentary/7647446/bounty gate-
black-sox-scandals-mars-every-sport. 
5. Id. 
6. Michael Weinreb, In Memoriam: Alex Karras, GRANTLAND (Oct. 11, 2012), http://grantland. 
com/the-triangle/in-memoriam-alex-karras/. 
7. See Associated Press, Giordano Ordered Held Without Bail in Gambling Ring, ESPN, http:// 
sports.espn.go.com/espn/poker/news/story?id=2680087 (last updated Nov. 29, 2006); Associated 
Press, New Jersey Businessman Sentenced to Probation, ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/ 
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scope of sports gambling. 
Outside of athletes’ involvement with sports gambling, American citizens 
have recently been indicted for their involvement in elaborate wagering 
schemes.  In October 2012, following an eighteen-month investigation, the state 
of New York issued twenty-five indictments after authorities discovered an 
illegal betting ring.8  Authorities uncovered that illegal bets were placed on both 
professional and college sports, as well as horse racing.9  The scheme spanned 
over five states, and it is estimated that payments totaled $50 million.10  Days 
after the New York indictments, nine youth football coaches in South Florida 
were also indicted for sports gambling.11  In this case, authorities conducted an 
eighteen-month investigation that uncovered a “rampant, elaborate and high-
dollar gambling [scheme] on little league football.”12 
While this Comment only provides a few examples of the widespread and 
elaborate nature of today’s sports gambling, it does shed light on what has 
become a consistent problem.  Legal or illegal, Americans continue to bet on 
sports.  Recently, states have taken notice of the money to be made in sports 
gambling and have attempted to find ways to either circumvent the current law 
or replace the current law all together.13  At a time when the economy has 
struggled, states are looking to sports gambling as a way to increase their own 
budgets while keeping the money out of the hands of bookies and Internet 
gambling websites.14 
One such effort to change the current law occurred when a New Jersey 
Representative proposed the Sports Gaming Opportunity Act of 2012 that 
would have legalized sports gambling throughout the country.15  The bill would 
have allowed states, over a four-year period, to create wagering schemes that 
would include the option to bet on single games.16  After the proposed 
legislation died in Congressional Committee, the Sports Gaming Opportunity 
 
story?id=2989587 (last updated Aug. 24, 2007); Scoop Jackson, Donaghy Isn’t Only One with 
Gambling Addiction, ESPN PAGE 2, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=jackson/0707 
23 (last updated July 23, 2007). 
8. Millman, supra note 1. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Paula Lavigne, Youth Coaches Face Gambling Charges, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/ 
story/_/id/8568724/nine-south-florida-youth-football-coaches-face-gambling-charges (last updated 
Oct. 30, 2012). 
12. Id. 
13. See Millman, supra note 1. 
14. Id. 
15. See Sports Gaming Opportunity Act of 2012, H.R. 3797, 112th Cong. (2012). 
16. Id. 
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Act was reintroduced in 2013.17  To date, the reintroduced bill continues to be 
held in the Congressional Committee, where it has been since February 13, 
2013,18 suggesting that it may face the same fate as its predecessor.  However, 
new federal legislation is not necessary if the Supreme Court would declare the 
current law, the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA),19 
unconstitutional.  In fact, this type of constitutional challenge is the argument 
that New Jersey has made in its ongoing case against the four professional sports 
leagues and the NCAA.20 
While the New Jersey case is most likely headed to the Supreme Court after 
the state lost in both the District Court and in the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals,21 the purpose of this Comment is not to focus on pending actions, but 
rather to take a general approach to challenging the validity of PASPA.  In doing 
so, this Comment will show that if the Court was to apply the Commerce Clause 
or the uniformity requirement of the Commerce Clause to its analysis of 
PASPA, states like New Jersey would be able to institute sports gambling 
systems that, in theory, would generate revenue for those states. 
Part II discusses the history of sports gambling by examining the 
development of federal law that culminated with PASPA, as well as looking at 
the judicial interpretation of the law and the rationale courts have applied to 
sports gambling cases.  Parts III and V look at potential constitutional claims 
that the Court should consider, including the Commerce Clause (Part III) and 
the uniformity requirement of the Commerce Clause (Part V).  Part IV shows 
how sports gambling supporters could argue that PASPA violates the 
Commerce Clause.  Finally, Part VI provides additional analysis to show that 
PASPA fosters unequal treatment among the states and, therefore, violates the 
uniformity requirement of the Commerce Clause. 
II.  HISTORY OF SPORTS GAMBLING 
Prior to 1961, several legislative statutes were implemented to regulate 
 
17. See Sports Gaming Opportunity Act of 2013, H.R. 625, 113th Cong. (2013). 
18. H.R. 625: Sports Gaming Opportunity Act of 2013, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/ 
congress/bills/113/hr625 (last visited Apr. 11, 2014). 
19. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (2012). 
20. See generally Associated Press, Brief Calls N.J. Law ‘Blatant Violation’, ESPN N.Y., http:// 
espn.go.com/new-york/nba/story/_/id/8723991/pro-leagues-ncaa-file-brief-new-jersey-betting-law 
(last updated Dec. 7, 2012). 
21. See Chris Sieroty, U.S. Supreme Court Is Last Option in New Jersey Sports Betting Case, LAS 
VEGAS REV.-J., http://www.reviewjournal.com/business/us-supreme-court-last-option-new-jer sey-
sports-betting-case (last updated Nov. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Sieroty, U.S. Supreme Court Is Last 
Option]. 
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gambling, but none were specifically enacted to limit sports wagering.22  This 
changed in 1961, when the enactment of three laws extended federal regulation 
of gambling to sports.23  The Wire Communications Act (WCA) not only made 
it illegal to use the phone to send or receive bets or provide gambling 
information, but also prohibited wagers on sports events made over any form of 
wire communication.24  Congress expanded upon the WCA by enacting the 
Transportation in Aid of Racketeering Enterprises Act, which extended the 
WCA to any form of travel or mail.25  Finally, the Interstate Transportation of 
Wagering Paraphernalia Act made it illegal to transport wagering pool 
paraphernalia related to sporting events.26  Since the enactment of these three 
laws, sports gambling has been illegal in the United States.27 
As time progressed, Congress continued to implement federal legislation to 
prevent sports gambling.  Other anti-gambling initiatives that have furthered the 
purpose of preventing sports gambling include acts that have required financial 
transactions greater than $10,000 to be reported,28 initialized protections against 
money laundering,29 and prohibited fund transfers from financial institutions to 
Internet gambling websites.30  All of these laws eventually paved the way for 
Congress to enact PASPA in 1992.31 
PASPA was created with the purpose of prohibiting a person or government 
entity from creating or authorizing a wagering scheme that involved 
professional or amateur athletes.32  Specifically, PASPA states as follows: 
It shall be unlawful for– 
(1) a governmental entity to sponsor, operate, advertise, 
promote, license, or authorize by law or compact, . . . 
. . . 
a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering 
scheme based, directly or indirectly (through the use of 
geographical references or otherwise), on one or more 
 
22. Paul Anderson, No Gambling Allowed: The Ban on Sports Gambling in the United States, 3 
GLOBAL SPORTS L. &   TAX’N REP. 24, 24 (2012). 
23. Id. 
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2012); see also Anderson, supra note 22, at 24. 
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)–(b) (2012); see also Anderson, supra note 22, at 24. 
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1953(a) (2012); see also Anderson, supra note 22, at 24. 
27. Anderson, supra note 22, at 24. 
28. 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2012). 
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2012). 
30. 31 U.S.C. § 5361 (2012). 
31. Professional And Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (2012). 
32. Id. § 3702. 
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competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes 
participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or more 
performances of such athletes in such games.33 
The statute defines “governmental entity” as “a State, a political subdivision of 
a State, or an entity or organization . . . that has governmental authority within 
the territorial boundaries of the United States.”34  Further, the statute clarifies 
the meaning of “State” as “any of the several States, the District of Columbia, 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern 
Mariana Islands, Palau, or any territory or possession of the United States.”35  
States could be exempted from PASPA if the states operated wagering schemes 
prior to PASPA taking effect in 1992.36 
Since the enactment of PASPA, cases challenging a state’s ability to 
implement a sports wagering scheme have often been turned away by courts for 
a failure to follow federal law.  One such case was OFC Comm Baseball v. 
Markell, which was initiated in 2009 after Delaware’s Governor Markell 
“proposed legislation authorizing sports betting . . . at existing and future 
[gaming] facilities in Delaware.”37  The planned legislation would have created 
a sports betting scheme that included wagering on the outcome of individual 
professional or collegiate sporting events, excluding all events involving college 
or professional teams within the state of Delaware.38  Markell’s argument for 
installing the betting scheme was that Delaware met the exemption contained in 
PASPA, as the state had a wagering system in place within the PASPA 
exemption period.39 
The court disagreed with Markell’s argument, holding that while Delaware 
was exempted under section 3704(1)(a) of PASPA, the state was only allowed 
to conduct the scheme as it existed between 1976 and 1990 and could not further 
that system.40  The court went on to state that “[c]ertain aspects of [Delaware’s 
sports] lottery may differ from the lottery as conducted in 1976, as long as 
[Delaware] do[es] not effectuate a substantive change from the scheme that was 
conducted during the exception period.”41  As single game betting was not 
conducted by Delaware between 1976 and 1990, Markell’s proposed scheme 
 
33. Id. 
34. Id. § 3701(2). 
35. Id. § 3701(5). 
36. Id. § 3704(a)(1)–(2). 
37. 579 F.3d 293, 295 (3d Cir. 2009). 
38. Id. at 296. 
39. Id. at 301. 
40. Id. at 301–03. 
41. Id. at 303. 
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did not meet the exception to PASPA.42 
Despite the court’s ruling in Markell, states were not done attempting to 
judicially overturn PASPA.  As the Markell court failed to address the 
constitutionality of PASPA, another case, Interactive Media Entertainment & 
Gaming Ass’n v. Holder, attempted to test PASPA’s validity under the U.S. 
Constitution.43  Several plaintiffs, all of whom were connected to New Jersey 
in some way, brought the case against the U.S. government.44  Plaintiffs 
challenged that PASPA violated several areas of the Constitution, including “the 
Commerce Clause, the First Amendment . . . , the Tenth Amendment, the 
Eleventh Amendment, . . . the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, and the Equal Protection Clause.”45  The government challenged 
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the case and that the “constitutional 
claims fail[ed] as a matter of law.”46  While the government’s motion to dismiss 
was pending, plaintiffs filed a supplemental brief to show that pending 
legislation would amend the New Jersey Constitution to allow the legislature to 
“authorize sports wagering” within the state.47  Despite this pending legislation, 
the court found for the government and dismissed the case for a lack of standing 
by all named plaintiffs for varying reasons.48  In the court’s view, New Jersey 
law at the time of the suit prohibited sports gambling, and any action brought to 
challenge PASPA’s constitutionality could not be done based on pending 
legislation.49 
Based on the holding in Interactive Media Entertainment, in order for New 
Jersey to challenge the constitutionality of PASPA in the courts, it would seem 
that state law would need to be changed.  Understanding this notion, New Jersey 
enacted legislation in 2012 that would allow for the state to institute wagering 
schemes involving single-game bets at Atlantic City casinos and state horse 
racing tracks.50  The decision to enact this legislation was due to the New Jersey 
legislature and Governor Chris Christie’s attempts to find a solution to save the 
struggling casino industry within the state.51  Upon New Jersey enacting the 
 
42. Id. at 304. 
43. No. 09-1301 (GEB), 2011 WL 802106, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2011). 
44. Id. at *2–3.  The group of plaintiffs included a New Jersey non-profit corporation consisting 
of members who provided Internet gambling services, associations involved in the New Jersey 
horseracing industry, and New Jersey State Senator Raymond J. Lesniak. Id. 
45. Id. at *5. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at *5–6. 
48. See generally id. at *11, 18–19, 23. 
49. Id. at *16. 
50. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 2(D). 
51. See Associated Press, Judge Against N.J. in Sports Betting, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/espn/ 
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legislation, the professional leagues, the NCAA, and the U.S. Department of 
Justice sued the state, claiming that New Jersey’s actions violated PASPA.52  
New Jersey countered by claiming that PASPA was unconstitutional, which, if 
true, would allow for the state to implement its sports wagering scheme.53 
Hoping that the court would uphold its newly created legislation, New 
Jersey centered its legal arguments on the presumption that PASPA violated the 
Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, Equal 
Protection Principles, and the Equal Footing Doctrine of the U.S. Constitution.54  
However, on February 28, 2013, a U.S. District Court judge ruled against New 
Jersey and found that the State’s constitutional arguments were not strong 
enough to overturn PASPA.55  The court reasoned that PASPA was “a rational 
expression of Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause,” that prior 
“Supreme Court precedent permits ‘grandfathering,’” and that “Congress had a 
rational basis to enact PASPA in the manner it chose” as reasons for why the 
statute’s constitutionality was upheld.56  Despite being defeated, New Jersey 
was encouraged by one line in the judge’s opinion, which stated “judicial 
intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwise a court considers a 
policy decision of the legislative branch.”57  Essentially, the court reasoned that 
if New Jersey disagreed with PASPA, the most efficient method to overturn 
PASPA was not through the judiciary, but through congressional legislative 
action, as courts would be unlikely to change a legislative policy decision.58  
However, the statement showed that, although not typically the case, a court 
could possibly declare a legislative policy unconstitutional if it felt the policy 
unwise.59 
Heeding this statement and hoping for better results, New Jersey appealed 
the case to the Third Circuit.60  Once again, the court, in a split 2–1 decision, 
upheld the constitutionality of PASPA.61  Specifically, the court held that 
 
story/_/id/9002043/judge-deals-setback-new-jersey-sports-gambling-effort (last updated Mar. 1, 
2013). 
52. Associated Press, Justice Dept. Joining Betting Lawsuit, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/espn/story 
/_/id/8869506/us-department-justice-join-suit-new-jersey-sports-betting-law (last updated Jan. 22, 
2013). 
53. NCAA v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 554 (D.N.J. 2013). 
54. Id. at 554. 
55. Id. at 554–55. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 555. 
58. Id. at 555. 
59. See id. 
60. See generally NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013). 
61. Id. at 215. 
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accepting New Jersey’s arguments would require the court to make the 
unprecedented step of “invalidating for the first time in [the Third] Circuit’s 
jurisprudence a law under the anti-commandeering principle,” something the 
court noted had only been done twice by the Supreme Court.62  Further, the 
court would have to expand the anti-commandeering principle in order to 
“suspend commonplace operations of the Supremacy Clause over state activity 
contrary to federal laws.”63  Finally, the court stated that going down this path 
would increase Congress’s difficulty of enacting laws “pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause” if those laws treat states differently.64  Similar to the district 
court, the Third Circuit mentioned that its job was not to decide whether PASPA 
was wise or whether it fulfilled its purpose to preserve the integrity of sports, 
but rather its purpose was to focus only on the “legality of these measures as a 
matter of constitutional law.”65 
Again, though, New Jersey had reason to be encouraged, as the lone holdout 
in a dissenting opinion argued that while he concurred in parts of the majority 
opinion, he would have held PASPA violated federalism principles articulated 
in Court precedent.66  The judge, in support of his conclusion, stated “PASPA 
is no ordinary federal statute that directly regulates interstate commerce or 
activities substantially affecting such commerce.  Instead, PASPA prohibits 
states from authorizing sports gambling and thereby directs how states must 
treat such activity.”67  For these reasons, the dissenting judge felt “uphold[ing] 
PASPA as a constitutional exercise of congressional authority” was wrong.68 
Hoping the Third Circuit would reconsider its case, New Jersey asked for a 
rehearing but was denied in November 2013.69  With that decision, the fate of 
New Jersey’s law and the future of sports gambling likely rests with the 
Supreme Court,70 as it is widely expected that the State will file the necessary 
paperwork to get the case in front of the Court.71  As of the writing of this 
Comment, the State has filed an appeal with the Court and awaits word on 
 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 251 (Vanaskie, T., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
67. Id. at 241. 
68. Id. 
69. Sieroty, U.S. Supreme Court Is Last Option, supra note 21. 
70. Id. 
71. See Reid Wilson, Christie Will Take Sports Gambling Fight to the Supreme Court, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 20, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2013/11/20/ 
christie-will-take-sports-gambling-fight-to-supreme-court/. 
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whether the justices will accept the case.72  Throughout the process, New Jersey 
and Governor Christie believed the case belonged in the Supreme Court, and 
the State will now have its shot to persuade the Court that PASPA is 
unconstitutional.73  While the Court could declare PASPA unconstitutional for 
numerous reasons, New Jersey’s hope is that the Court will not hide behind 
precedent like the lower courts have done previously in this case and instead 
will be willing to hold states’ rights over federal rights.74 
III.  THE COURT’S HISTORY IN DECIDING INTERSTATE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
ISSUES 
As New Jersey’s case points out, there are several ways that the 
constitutionality of PASPA can be attacked.75  While several options are 
available to the Court, one promising option that could be utilized to declare 
PASPA unconstitutional is through the application of the Court’s interpretations 
of the Commerce Clause.  Broadly speaking, the United States Constitution 
grants Congress the power to regulate commerce among the states.76  While 
Congress has the power to regulate, the Court has ultimately held the power in 
deciding how the Commerce Clause has been applied.77  In terms of the 
constitutionality of PASPA, critics have often pointed to a failure of sports 
gambling to “substantially affect” interstate commerce.78  To understand how 
the Court has interpreted and applied substantial affect to Commerce Clause 
issues, it is necessary to turn to case law. 
In United States v. Lopez, the Court established three categories where 
Congress could exercise power to regulate commerce.79  The first category 
allowed Congress to regulate the channels of interstate commerce.80  Second, 
Congress could regulate the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or those 
 
72. Ryan Hutchins, NJ Appeals Sports Betting Case to U.S. Supreme Court, NJ.COM, http:// 
www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/02/nj_appeals_sports_betting_case_to_us_supreme_court.html 
(last updated Feb. 18, 2014). 
73. Ryan Hutchins, N.J. Sports Gambling to Place Final Bets in the U.S. Supreme Court, NJ.COM, 
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/12/sports_betting_chris_christie_us_supreme_co 
urt_appeal_atlantic_city_casinos_horse_tracks_ncaa_nba_ml.html (last updated Dec. 10, 2013). 
74. See id. 
75. See generally NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 2013). 
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
77. See generally Commerce Clause, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/comm 
erce_clause (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
78. Jason J. Ranjo, Note, Game Over?: The Potential Demise of the Professional and Amateur 
Sports Protection Act, 42 RUTGERS L.J. 213, 218 (2010). 
79. 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). 
80. Id. at 558. 
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involved in interstate commerce, even if the law targeted intrastate activities.81  
The third category gave Congress the power to regulate those activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.82 
The Court furthered its analysis of the commerce clause in United States v. 
Morrison.83  In Morrison, the Court established four factors to help determine 
whether a federal statute should be upheld under the commerce clause.84  These 
considerations include: (1) the economic activity to be regulated;85 (2) whether 
the statute contains a jurisdictional element that might limit the effect on 
interstate commerce;86 (3) whether the statute or the statute’s legislative history 
shows an effect on interstate commerce;87 and (4) whether the link between the 
regulated conduct and its effect on interstate commerce is satisfied.88  The Court 
reiterated from previous cases that the ultimate decision of whether particular 
activities affect interstate commerce is a judicial question and not a legislative 
one.89 
The last useful case in providing clarity to the Court’s approach to 
substantial effect Commerce Clause issues is Gonzales v. Raich.90  In Gonzales, 
the Court held that “Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not 
itself ‘commercial,’ in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure 
to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate 
market in that commodity.”91  The Court continued its analysis by reestablishing 
the rational basis test, which allows for the Court to uphold the statute if, when 
taken as a whole, the activity rationally affects interstate commerce.92  
Essentially, the Court does not require a showing of fact that interstate 
commerce is affected, just a rational basis for reaching that conclusion.93 
 
 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 558–59. 
83. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
84. Id. at 610–12. 
85. Id. at 610. 
86. Id. at 611–12. 
87. Id. at 612. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 614. 
90. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
91. Id. at 18. 
92. See id. at 22. 
93. Id. 
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IV.  SPORTS GAMBLING’S SUBSTANTIAL AFFECT ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE 
For the Court to declare PASPA unconstitutional via the Commerce Clause, 
it will need to examine sports gambling through the framework laid out in 
Lopez, Morrison, and Gonzales.  Initially, in determining the constitutionality 
of PASPA, the Court must classify the category under Lopez in which Congress 
is allowed to exercise its power to regulate.  The first two categories, the 
channels of interstate commerce and the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce,94 do not relate to or control the activity of sports gambling.  Rather, 
the third category, activities that substantially affect interstate commerce,95 
would most likely be the area the Court would deem sports gambling would fall 
under.96  From here, the Court would then be able to apply the Morrison factors 
to PASPA to determine if Congress had the power to regulate the sports 
gambling industry. 
A.  Sports Gambling Is a Business 
The first factor in Morrison examines whether the regulated activity is 
commercial.97  Sports gambling is a booming business within the United States.  
As mentioned earlier, it is estimated that Americans alone gamble in excess of 
$500 billion a year on sports, with only $2–3 billion gambled legally in the state 
of Nevada.98  Yet, the question posed is whether this business should need to be 
regulated by the federal government.  New Jersey does not believe so, as 
recognized by its continued efforts to implement a sports wagering scheme.99  
In response to a lawsuit by the professional sports leagues and the NCAA, New 
Jersey has argued that gambling is so widespread that any implementation of a 
state wagering system would have no effect on sports.100  As the sports 
gambling industry continues to grow despite the presence of PASPA, it is worth 
suggesting that the federal government step aside and let states try to regulate 
the industry themselves.  This type of action would not only benefit cash-
strapped states that wish to have more options to raise capital,101 but would also 
 
94. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). 
95. Id. at 558–59. 
96. See Ranjo, supra note 78, at 220–22 (explaining how gambling substantially effects interstate 
commerce). 
97. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000). 
98. Millman, supra note 1. 
99. See Associated Press, Leagues Have No Standing, Brief Says, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/espn 
/story/_/id/8350090/leagues-no-standing-sports-betting-suit-new-jersey-court-filing-says (last updated 
Sept. 7, 2012). 
100. Id. 
101. One report estimates that New Jersey alone would benefit from the implementation of sports 
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provide information as to whether sports gambling is capable of being regulated 
from a state-down approach. 
A counter argument to the state-down approach could be to dissolve PASPA 
completely and introduce new legislation that bans all forms of sports gambling 
in the United States, including the schemes currently enjoyed by states, such as 
Nevada, which fell within PASPA’s grandfather provision in section 3704.102  
However, this type of approach is unlikely to be successful considering the 
widespread growth of the sports gambling industry.103  It is unlikely that a 
federal ban on all sports gambling would be successful or the most efficient 
method to curb individuals placing bets, considering the amount of money that 
is already being gambled illegally in the United States.104  In a way, “[t]he 
[federal] ban on sports betting does exactly what Prohibition did.  It makes 
criminals rich.”105  To quote a gambling law expert, “‘Gambling has typically 
been a state issue’” and should be left to state regulation.106 
B.  No Jurisdictional Element Exists Within PASPA 
Morrison’s second factor looks at whether there is a jurisdictional element 
within the statute.107  Within PASPA, there is no language that directly limits 
the statutes applicability to certain jurisdictions.108  This includes the 
exemption, which allowed for states to conduct sports wagering schemes if the 
schemes existed in the period from 1976 to 1990.109 
C.  PASPA’s Legislative History Does Not Address Interstate Commerce 
The third factor of Morrison, whether the statute or the statute’s legislative 
history shows an effect on interstate commerce,110 could play a substantial role 
 
wagering to the tune of nearly $100 million annually.  See Chris Sieroty, Federal Court Tosses New 
Jersey Sports Betting Law, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., http://www.reviewjournal.com/business/casinos-
gaming/federal-court-tosses-new-jersey-sports-betting-law (last updated Sept. 17, 2013) [hereinafter 
Sieroty, Federal Court Tosses N.J. Sports Betting Law]. 
102. See 28 U.S.C. § 3704 (2012). 
103. See Chad Millman, Harm of Betting to Leagues Remains Unclear, ESPN (Mar. 1, 2013, 9:48 
AM), http://espn.go.com/insider/blog/_/name/millman_chad/id/9002204/betting-new-jersey-rul ing-
harm-betting-sports-leagues-remains-unclear. 
104. See James Surowiecki, A Call to Action, NEW YORKER (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.new 
yorker.com/talk/financial/2013/02/11/130211ta_talk_surowiecki#ixzz2JwuurTAw. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. (quoting I. Nelson Rose, a gambling law expert at Whittier Law School). 
107. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611–12 (2000). 
108. 28 U.S.C. § 3701 (2012). 
109. Id. § 3704 (a)(1). 
110. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612. 
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in the Court’s decision on whether sports gambling affects interstate commerce.  
According to U.S. Senator Bill Bradley, the real reason for creating PASPA was 
to prevent “the harm that state-sponsored sports betting causes” among 
America’s fans and youth.111  Further, in its recommendation for passage of 
PASPA, a Judiciary Committee report stated that the act was necessary in order 
“to maintain the integrity of our national pastime.”112  In essence the law was 
created for two reasons: 1) to protect America’s national pastimes and preserve 
the integrity of sport and its athletes, and 2) to preserve the moral values of 
America’s youth by preventing a culture of gambling.113  If these issues were 
so prevalent and dire that Congress passed an Act to federally regulate sports 
gambling, then why did it allow for an exemption for the states of Nevada, 
Delaware, Oregon, and Montana?114  What Congress ultimately created with 
PASPA was a culture that did not say gambling was something that needed to 
be eliminated but instead something that needed to be curtailed.115 
Ultimately, what has happened is that Nevada continues to profit greatly 
from its monopoly on the sports betting industry while other states, including 
Delaware, Oregon, and Montana, are forced to swallow the restrictions of 
PASPA.116  However, while some believe that PASPA has proven effective in 
preventing the expansion of sports gambling,117 based off of the recent 
indictments and statistics reported previously in this Comment,118 one must 
question whether PASPA is indeed regulating the industry or if instead it has 
pushed the industry into areas that do not meet the legislative purpose of the 
Act.  Regardless, the legislative history fails to properly address a link 
connecting PASPA to interstate commerce. 
 
 
 
 
 
111. Bill Bradley, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act—Policy Concerns Behind 
Senate Bill 474, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5, 8 (1992). 
112. BILL BRADLEY, PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS PROTECTION ACT, S. REP. NO. 102-
248, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3555. 
113. Id. at 4–5. 
114. Anthony G. Galasso, Jr., Note, Betting Against the House (and Senate): The Case for Legal, 
State-Sponsored Sports Wagering in a Post-PASPA World, 99 KY. L.J. 163, 167 (2010–11). 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. See, e.g., id. at 169. 
118. Looking specifically at the current estimated size of the betting industry and the indictments 
issued over illegal betting schemes concerning all levels of sports.  See generally supra Part I. 
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D.  A Rational Link May Not Exist Connecting PASPA and Interstate 
Commerce 
The final factor from Morrison, whether a link between the regulated 
conduct and its affect on interstate commerce is satisfied,119 is not as clear cut 
as what it may seem.  Typically, the Court has only upheld cases concerning the 
Commerce Clause when the activity itself is economic in nature and there is 
some resemblance of a link between the conduct and interstate commerce.120  
Here, it is hard to debate that sports gambling would be anything but economic 
in nature.  This Comment has already shown the staggering amount of money 
that is gambled per year in the United States.121  If gambling were to be 
legalized, it no doubt would be a substantial economic endeavor for whoever is 
permitted to undertake and create a wagering scheme.122 
However, the true question within this fourth factor rests in the link between 
PASPA and interstate commerce.  To answer this question, it is necessary to 
contemplate whether economic factors were considered when PASPA was 
established.  As was seen previously, the legislature’s intent did not mention nor 
discuss the financial implications that sports gambling possessed.123  Instead, 
the legislature created PASPA for morality and integrity reasons.124  This 
presents the question of whether the Court may expand upon the legislature’s 
intent when determining if the regulated conduct is related to interstate 
commerce.  As Morrison does not address this question directly, it would be 
helpful to apply the rational basis test that the Court reestablished in Gonzales 
to determine if there is indeed a credible link between PASPA and the regulation 
of interstate commerce. 
The Court has two ways in which it could perform a rational basis test: (1) 
through a general approach; or (2) through a more in-depth analysis.125  When 
applying a general approach to sports gambling, it would seem rational that a 
wagering scheme could affect interstate commerce.  Using information already 
discussed in this Comment, if gambling were to be legalized, and the $500 
 
119. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000). 
120. Id. at 613. 
121. See Millman, supra note 1. 
122. See generally Sieroty, Federal Court Tosses N.J. Sports Betting Law, supra note 101 
(specifically the economic benefit New Jersey alone would enjoy if allowed to implement a sports 
wagering scheme). 
123. BILL BRADLEY, PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS PROTECTION ACT, S. REP. NO. 102-
248, at 4–5 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3555–56. 
124. Id. 
125. See generally Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 
(2000). 
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billion that is gambled on sports per year in the United States continued,126 it is 
quite conceivable that there would be some effect on interstate commerce.  
However, the Court must not stop at this simple approach.  Rather, the Court 
should undertake an in-depth analysis of the rationality of PASPA and decide 
whether the Act accomplishes its intended purpose.  In doing so, the Court 
would be wise to consider similar wagering schemes, such as horseracing, 
which are regulated by the states underneath their police powers.127 
Horseracing poses the closest relationship to sports gambling in society in 
terms of wagering schemes.  In the early 1990s and for most of the 2000s, the 
amount of money gambled legally on horseracing escalated quickly.128  Much 
of this was due to the increased presence of off-track betting sites and relaxed 
off-track betting legislation, as nearly eighty percent of the money gambled on 
horses was laid down at off-track betting sites.129  Despite the downturn in the 
economy over the last few years, horseracing seems to have survived the 
recession, posting in 2012 its first increase in money gambled on the sport since 
2006.130 
Much like sports gambling, horseracing is an economic activity that affects 
interstate commerce.  However, with the exception of a period in the early 
1900s, states have had the privilege and the power to institute horseracing 
wagering schemes.131  While this power has been passed down through the 
legislature with the Interstate Horse Racing Act of 1978,132 it poses the question 
as to why the legislature would allow state-sponsored wagering schemes on 
horseracing but not wagering schemes on sports.  The logical answer is to revert 
back to the legislature’s intent to outlaw wagering schemes in professional 
sports for morality and integrity reasons.133  This, in turn, brings the argument 
 
126. Millman, supra note 1. 
127. See Hubel v. W. Va. Racing Comm’n, 376 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.W.Va. 1974); Sandstrom v. Cal. 
Horse Racing Bd., 189 P.2d 17, 21 (Cal. 1948); Greenberg v. Western Turf Ass’n, 82 P. 684, 685 (Cal. 
1905). 
128. See generally Bethany McLean, Billion-Dollar Horse Play: The Future of the Sport of Kings 
Is in the Hands of Three Very Different Players. Can Live Racing Be Saved?, CNNMONEY (Oct. 29, 
2001), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2001/10/29/312430/index. htm. 
129. Joan S. Howland, Essay, Let’s Not “Spit the Bit” in Defense of “The Law of the Horse”: The 
Historical and Legal Development of American Thoroughbred Racing, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 473, 
504 (2004). 
130. See Tom LaMarra, Total Handle up for First Time Since 2006, BLOODHORSE.COM (Jan. 5, 
2013), https://www.bloodhorse.com/horse-racing/articles/75370/total-handle-up-for-first-time-since-
2006.  According to this report, almost $11 billion was legally gambled on horse racing in the United 
States in 2012.  Id. 
131. See Howland, supra note 129, at 496–97. 
132. 15 U.S.C. § 3001 (2012). 
133. BILL BRADLEY, PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS PROTECTION ACT, S. REP. NO. 102-
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back to the link between PASPA and regulating interstate commerce, and at the 
very least, leaves some doubt as to whether a rational link does indeed exist. 
After weighing the Morrison factors, it is not unreasonable to see how the 
Court could side with the states and declare PASPA unconstitutional.  While 
sports gambling is no doubt a business and no jurisdictional element exists 
within PASPA, the legislative intent and the doubt as to whether a rational link 
exists between PASPA and regulating interstate commerce could create a strong 
enough reason for the law to not be upheld.  The fact that PASPA regulates an 
economic activity that is extremely valuable should not be enough, on the 
merits, to prevent the Court from at least performing a Commerce Clause 
analysis on whether there is a substantial affect on interstate commerce. 
V.  THE UNIFORMITY REQUIREMENT OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
If the Court holds that sports gambling does indeed substantially affect 
interstate commerce, there are other ways that PASPA could also be found 
unconstitutional.  Another likely option would be that the law violates the 
uniformity requirement of the Commerce Clause.134  In terms of uniformity, 
Congressional Acts should not treat individuals who are “similarly situated” 
differently.135  Uniformity can be a tricky issue to prove, as Congress once again 
must only show a rational basis for linking the activity to interstate commerce 
and not necessarily direct facts showing the connection.136  The key component 
in determining uniformity is understanding that the Constitution does not 
necessarily provide for equal rules, but rather requires equal treatment.137 
When considering the uniformity requirement’s application to sports 
gambling, it is important to take note of Congress’ rationale in passing the 
Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978.138  The Interstate Horseracing Act 
essentially allowed for states to set up their own state-sponsored wagering 
schemes.139  Specifically, the Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978 states that “the 
States should have the primary responsibility for determining what forms of 
gambling may legally take place within their borders.”140  In addition, the Act 
was developed to help “further the horseracing and legal off-track betting 
 
248, at 4–5 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3555–56. 
134. See generally Galasso, supra note 114, at 173. 
135. Id. at 174. 
136. See id. at 173. 
137. Id. at 174. 
138. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 3001 (2012). 
139. Id. 
140. Id. § 3001(a)(1). 
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industries.”141 
When combining the rationale of the Interstate Horseracing Act and the 
goals of uniformity,142 it is clear that Congress was not meant to have the power 
to enact legislation that would treat one state different from the next.143  
Essentially, this is exactly what Congress did through the grandfather provision 
contained in PASPA.144 
VI.  PASPA VIOLATES THE UNIFORMITY REQUIREMENT OF THE COMMERCE 
CLAUSE 
As noted above, the uniformity requirement of the Commerce Clause 
requires that states be treated equally.145  With PASPA, the legislature created 
an exemption that allowed for states to be excluded from the law if the wagering 
scheme existed prior to the law going into effect in 1992.146  While this 
exemption was extended to four states (Nevada, Oregon, Delaware, and 
Montana), Nevada is the only state that has substantial options for those looking 
to place a wager on an individual game.147  This exemption not only provides a 
monopoly for Nevada in individualized betting, but it creates a steady revenue 
stream for the state that other states are not able to realize.148  One must question 
if this benefit that Nevada is able to enjoy is indeed an unequal treatment created 
by PASPA. 
In cases where the uniformity requirement is questioned, the Court will 
apply a rational basis test to determine if the act treats similarly situated states 
differently.149  By examining PASPA’s rationality, it is hard to conceive any 
possibility that would declare PASPA rational.  In the Judiciary Committee’s 
report, U.S. Senator Chuck Grassley stated that the issue surrounding uniformity 
is even more of a problem than states’ rights issues.150  Grassley went on to state 
that as a “‘matter of Federal policy,’” no rational basis exists that would allow 
 
141. Id. § 3001(b). 
142. Essentially, the Horseracing Act allows states to be the primary decision makers on what 
forms of gambling will be allowed within the state, which complies with the uniformity requirement 
that states be treated equally.  15 U.S.C. § 3001; Galasso, supra note 114, at 174. 
143. Galasso, supra note 114, at 173–74. 
144. 28 U.S.C. § 3704 (2012). 
145. See generally Galasso, supra note 114, at 173–74. 
146. See 28 U.S.C. § 3704. 
147. Galasso, supra note 114, at 164, 168. 
148. Id. at 168. 
149. See id. at 173. 
150. BILL BRADLEY, PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS PROTECTION ACT, S. REP. NO. 102-
248, at 13 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3563. 
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sports gambling to occur in three states151 but not the rest of the country.152  
Similarly, Grassley contended that even the discrepancies between the states 
that fit under the exemption were not rational and simply made no sense.153  
Grassley used Delaware as an example, stating that when PASPA was accepted 
into law, the state had not conducted a wagering scheme for some time.154  Yet, 
because of the exemption that Delaware was granted, the state can, at any time, 
resurrect its sport wagering scheme as it existed at the time of PASPA’s 
initiation.155  This no doubt creates an advantage for the four states with 
exemptions, allowing them to enjoy a benefit that other states do not have the 
right to enjoy. 
Utilizing one individual’s analysis of the uniformity restraint on the 
Commerce Clause, it is easy to see how PASPA creates a regulation that treats 
the same issue differently among the states.156  The analysis proposes that if 
states were indeed allowed to legalize sports gambling, a system of uniform 
treatment would be initiated despite the fact that the rules could, and very well 
may, be different amongst the states.157  Essentially, uniform treatment, and not 
uniform rules, is what the uniformity clause is intended to guarantee.158  While 
some may argue that this rationale is not enough on its own to overturn the 
constitutionality of PASPA,159 this Comment asks if that is truly the case.  Even 
if the Court has shifted its course in regulating the Commerce Clause and the 
application of the Clause’s provisions,160 nothing is to say that the Court could 
not change its mind when considering the financial crises that many states are 
currently experiencing. 
Much like has been seen with horseracing, where taxes have led to increased 
revenues for states and local governments,161 legalizing sports gambling could 
 
151. While the exemption applies to four states (Nevada, Oregon, Delaware, and Montana), 
Grassley only mentions three states (Nevada, Oregon, and Delaware) as being grandfathered.  Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Galasso, supra note 114, at 175–76. 
156. See, e.g., id. at 173–74 (citing Thomas B. Colby, Revitalizing the Forgotten Uniformity 
Constraint on the Commerce Power, 91 VA. L. REV. 249, 255–56 (2005)). 
157. Id. at 174 (quoting Thomas B. Colby, Revitalizing the Forgotten Uniformity Constraint on 
the Commerce Power, 91 VA. L. REV. 249, 265 (2005)). 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 176–77. 
160. See id. at 176–77. 
161. Luke P. Breslin, Comment, Reclaiming the Glory in the “Sport of Kings”—Uniformity Is the 
Answer, 20 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 297, 303 (2010).  For an example of how states and local 
governments have been benefitted financially, consider the following: CAL HORSE RACING BD., 42 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA HORSE RACING BOARD (2012), available at http:// 
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create financial avenues for states through taxes on the wagering schemes.162  
Despite the fact that the downturn in the economy has affected gambling on 
horseracing and the amount of money generated from the activity, the fact of 
the matter is that over $12 billion was gambled on horses in 2009, a decline of 
about 9% from the national average.163  If sports gambling’s estimated total of 
$500 billion dropped by the same percentage as horse racing, then the total 
gambled on sports would still be in excess of $450 billion.164  If states were 
given the power to regulate this activity, much like the state of Nevada is 
allowed to do currently, the profits from tax revenue could be extremely large. 
Additionally, the lack of control that PASPA has on the sports gambling 
enterprise should be considered.  A telling statistic concerning this control is, 
“Less than 1% of all sports wagering on human athletic events is done 
legally.”165  Further, enforcement of illegal gambling has dropped significantly 
in the last fifty years.166  Based off this information, one must ask if PASPA is 
intended to prevent and stop the financial boom created by sports gambling, or 
if it is to sweep the activity under the rug for morality and integrity reasons.  
Looking at this problem rationally, it would be difficult to determine that the 
law has anything to do with economics.  If PASPA did deal with economic 
reasons, it is unlikely the federal government, which is facing a severe financial 
deficit in its own right, would let this untapped resource drift afloat. 
Without economics being the driving force behind the law, a return to the 
legislative history is needed.  While the law may have been created for morality 
and integrity reasons,167 sports gambling is still prevalent throughout society.  
 
www.chrb.ca.gov/annual_reports/2012_annual_report.pdf (showing a benefit of $3.8 million to local 
governments); and KEVIN T. MCNAMARA & MARY KNUDSON, ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF INDIANA’S 
PARI-MUTUEL HORSE INDUSTRY ON INDIANA, 1 (2001), available at http://www.in.gov/hrc/files/ 
CompleteStudy.pdf (demonstrating payments of over $4 million to the state from pari-mutuel racing 
operations). 
162. See generally Sieroty, Federal Court Tosses N.J. Sports Betting Law, supra note 101 
(estimating that New Jersey alone could see additional revenues from sports gambling of $100 million). 
163. Anthony Cabot, The Absence of a Comprehensive Federal Policy Toward Internet and Sports 
Wagering and a Proposal for Change, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 271, 271 (2010) (citing Frank 
Angst, Another Billion-dollar Decline in Wagering, THOROUGHBRED TIMES, (Jan. 6, 2010), 
http://www.thoroughbredtimes.com/national-news/2010/January/06/Wagering-on-US-races-dips-in-
December.aspx). 
164. While it is reported that the amount of money gambled on horseracing was calculated at just 
under $11 billion in 2012, the general concept expressed using 2009 figures is still relevant.  See 
LaMarra, supra note 130.  If sports gambling saw a similar decline in wagers placed, the amount 
gambled would still be estimated at over $400 billion.  See Id. 
165. Cabot, supra note 163, at 272. 
166. See id. at 273. 
167. BILL BRADLEY, PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS PROTECTION ACT, S. REP. NO. 102-
248, at 4–5 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3555–56. 
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From fantasy sports leagues to daily lines being placed in the newspaper,168 
Americans are inundated with gambling information, almost to the point that it 
may seem as if sports gambling, and not the sports themselves, is America’s 
favorite pastime.  However, as was mentioned earlier, the problems with sports 
gambling continue to increase.169  This leads to the question of whether another 
approach could reasonably accomplish the goals set out by the legislature in 
adopting PASPA, such as allowing states to regulate wagering schemes. 
While this may raise the question of integrity and morality, one 
commentator notes that legal bookmakers have an economic interest in assuring 
that the competitions are fair and produce a just result.170  This desire to protect 
the integrity of the game and root out any corruption within sports is more 
closely aligned with the goals of the legislature than what PASPA has shown to 
accomplish.  If the Court is to act rationally, it must see how the Nevada gaming 
structure has not only benefited the economy of the state but has helped in 
weeding out corruption in sport.  Other states should be given the opportunity 
to address sports gambling and decide for themselves whether they would like 
to institute a wagering scheme.  Giving each state the choice is the only way to 
ensure equal treatment, unless the legislature bans sports gambling altogether.  
However, with such economic viability in this untapped resource, it would seem 
irrational to do anything but give states the power to decide if they would like 
to establish a scheme of their own.  For these reasons, the Court should declare 
PASPA unconstitutional for a failure to rationally apply the uniformity restraint 
of the Commerce Clause. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Sports gambling and the constitutionality of PASPA will remain to be a 
debated topic as states like New Jersey continue to push for the implementation 
of state-sponsored wagering schemes.171  If the Court would examine PASPA 
constitutionally, it is not a guarantee that the law would be upheld.  While this 
Comment has only focused on two constitutional attacks on the Act, several 
other constitutional challenges exist that could ultimately spell an end to 
PASPA.172  In what has become an economic recession, federal, state, and local 
 
168. See Cabot, supra note 163, at 273–74. 
169. See Part I, supra. 
170. Galasso, supra note 114, at 177. 
171. New Jersey is not alone in trying to end PASPA, as legislators in California, Missouri, Rhode 
Island, and Iowa are all seeking to end the Act.  Kyle Smith, Legalize Sports Betting, and Let Gov. 
Chris Christie Spike the Football, FORBES (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kyle 
smith/2012/08/23/legalize-sports-betting-and-let-gov-chris-christie-spike-the-football/. 
172. NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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governments continue to look for ways to raise capital and decrease growing 
deficits.  Looking at PASPA rationally, it does not serve the purpose for which 
it was created, as a number of individuals associated with sports continue to be 
prosecuted for their involvement with illegal betting rings.  These instances of 
illegal sports betting are not helping to maintain nor progress the integrity or 
morality of sports.  If the Court is willing to step in a new direction and analyze 
PASPA with more than the economic effect on interstate commerce in mind, it 
is likely that the Act will be declared unconstitutional and states will have the 
power to regulate their own wagering schemes.  In doing so, sports gambling 
may be able to not only produce revenue for the states, but also be controlled by 
those who wish to keep the integrity and morality of sports alive.  That is a bet 
the legislature is sure to accept. 
 
